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Executive Summary 
As oil prices reached low levels in 2016, many countries dependent on oil revenues 
experienced significant budget deficit. Saudi Arabia, for which oil revenue accounts for 
more than 80% (FETEHA, 2017), chose to implement a fiscal reform to reduce its oil 
dependency by creating other sources of income through the diversification and the 
liberalization of the country.  
Although fiscal reform is a good strategy for the long run and for the country in general, 
the solution does not take into account the price risk; a risk the national oil company will 
always have to face.  
This research paper will describe the financial instruments available on the market to 
mitigate price risk. It examines the distinctive characteristics and lay out the similarities 
and differences in order to allow the reader to have a good understanding about the 
derivative instruments.   
Moreover, this research paper will analyze the Hacienda Hedge – the biggest oil trade 
on Wall Street as well as three companies’ hedging strategies in order to define their 
practices. On top of that, Equinor – the Norwegian Oil Company was also investigated. 
My objective was to determine whether or not Saudi Arabia could have its national oil 
company – Saudi Aramco – hedging its production. The feasibility of such transactions 
was assessed by considering the derivatives market size as well as the power of Saudi 
Arabia within the global oil market. Saudi Arabia being considered as a price maker, a 
question arisen to know if there would be a counterparty taking the other side of the 
transaction, if any. Lastly, the hedging practices which were analyzed documented 
recommendations for potential hedging strategy. 
This study comes to the conclusion that Saudi Aramco should hedge part of its 
production. The company should implement a strategy to lock in their revenues 
especially with the rise of the shale industry. The oil market will be well supplied for the 
coming years meaning that the price could possibly remain at low levels as OPEC cut-
back measure to increase oil price is not sustainable by all the members and it reduces 
only OPEC’s market share. The analysis based on Equinor has shown that the 
implementation of a government pension fund would be an opportunity to consider in the 
long run but would require a change in the structure of the company.  
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1. Introduction  
From 1970-1972 to 2011-2013, the price of oil recorded an astonishing increase of 886 
percent (AGUILERA, RADETZKI, 2016, p.11). Like any other market, the oil market is 
influenced by supply and demand. Over the years, events such as the embargo on the 
United States of America (USA) concerning the Yom Kippur War, the Iran-Iraq war as 
well as the Arab spring has greatly influenced the price of the commodity.  
Mid-2014, the global oversupply led to a decrease in price. No country was willing to cut 
production to foster the price of oil; the price went from a peak above $115/barrel in June 
2014 to under $35/barrel at the end of February 2016 (ROGOFF, 2016). In May 2018 
Brent oil price hit $80.00 per barrel and generally oil prices have been floating around 
$70/barrel since (OIL PRICE, 2018). 
As a result, oil producing companies have been suffering from lower revenues and hence 
losses. Countries such as Venezuela, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia but not limited to, are 
highly dependent on oil revenues and are suffering the consequences of lower oil prices 
(AGUILERA, RADETZKI, 2016). 
Saudi Arabia, for which oil revenue accounts for more than 80% of the country’s income, 
experienced significant deficit in its budget. Its budget deficit in 2016 accounted for 
12.8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 8.9% in 2017.The country still plan to run 
a deficit of 7.3% of GDP in 2018 (FETEHA, 2017). According to the International 
Monetary Fund , an oil price of $105.60 is needed to balance the budget which is roughly 
double of current price level (THE WORLD BANK, Unknown publication date). As low oil 
prices greatly impacted Saudi’s economy, the country implemented a fiscal reform in 
which it wishes to diminish its oil dependency by creating other form of revenue for the 
government such as VAT, and through the liberalization and the diversification of the 
country. 
While some countries implemented fiscal reform, Mexico and some private-owned oil 
producers have been implementing hedging strategies to minimize their risks and secure 
revenues. This is the reason why I have chosen this subject. In financial instruments I 
see a tool which a country such as Saudi Arabia should not neglect due to its high 
dependency. I believe Saudi Arabia should implement a hedging strategy and tackle the 
price risk which it is inevitably subject to, assuming that it is a viable option. 
The objectives of this paper are to look at the different hedging strategies available for 
oil-producing companies. In the first part, I will present Saudi Aramco, the OPEC and 
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make a comparison of the Mexican state-owned oil producing company PEMEX and 
Saudi Aramco. I will follow with the introduction of derivatives and expose the theoretical 
aspects of derivatives instruments. In the second part, I will analyse three companies’ 
financial reports to understand their hedging strategy. The companies chosen are 
PEMEX –including the Hacienda hedge, EOG Resources – a shale company and BP - 
a supermajor in oil & gas production. I will also look into the Norwegian oil company 
Equinor as the company walked Saudi Armaco’s path in 2001 by going partially public. 
The purpose of the analysis is to understand the strategies available to Saudi Aramco 
and evaluate the feasibility of a hedging strategy. Because of the importance of Aramco’s 
production and their position in the oil market, the question of the possibility for the 
company to hedge will be a crucial one to answer.  
1.1 Saudi Aramco  
1.1.1 The company 
Saudi Aramco (Aramco) is the state-owned oil producing company of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) founded in 1933 through a concession with the Standard Oil 
Company of California (Socal). The company is headquartered in Dhahran (KSA). 
Aramco is engaged in hydrocarbons exploration, production, refining, distribution and 
marketing. The company has grown to be the top world exporter of oil and natural gas. 
It is a vertically integrated energy company employing more than 65’000 people 
worldwide (SAUDI ARAMCO, 2016). 
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As per Figure 1, we can see that Aramco is active in three major global markets; North 
America, Asia and Europe with 13 global offices around the three regions. R&D 
center/technology offices are all located outside of Saudi Arabia within the three regions. 
Inversely, all shipping terminals, refineries and bulk plants are located within the country. 
Aramco possesses multiple joint ventures in the global markets (Houston, Maastricht, 
Alexandria, etc.)  
Aramco’s 2016 Annual Review (Figure 2) presented a slight increase in production of 
300’000 barrels a day amounting to 10.5 million barrels per day (mmbpd). Its crude oil 
and condensate reserves increased as well to 260.8 billions barrels representing 21.9% 
of world’s proven reserves (OPEC, 2017).  Aramco experienced a rise in its crude oil 
exports; from 2’603 to 2’799 million barrels in 2016. Two third of its exports are headed 
to Asia, 15.8 percent to the USA – despite the rise of the shale industry, 11.3 percent to 
Europe and 6.2 percent to other countries. The exports amounted to $136 billion, 
representing 20 percent of the world crude oil exports (WORKMAN, 2018). There is no 
information available on financial results in the company’s annual review.  
Figure 2 Aramco’s crude oil production, reserves and exports 
 
Source: Saudi Aramco – Annual Review 2016 (p.74) 
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1.1.2 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
OPEC is a permanent and intergovernmental organization created in 1960 at the 
Baghdad Conference by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and Venezuela. Throughout the 
years, the five founding members were joined by ten other countries: Qatar, Libya, United 
Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. 
Indonesia joined the organization as well in 1962 but suspended its membership in 
November 2016. Today, OPEC’s headquarters are located in Vienna, Austria.  
The objective of the organization is “ to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its 
Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets” (OPEC, 2018) which 
involves the creation of a steady supply of petroleum to the consumers in general and a 
reasonable return on capital to the producers.  
The influence of Saudi Arabia within the organization has been unchallenged. Due to its 
large crude oil production capacity, Saudi Arabia is the only country having a large 
excess capacity available to face market interruptions and demand surges. Over the 
years, Saudi Arabia has softened the impact of critical oil supply interruptions such as 
during the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait and the Venezuelan crisis of 2003 
(AGUILERA, RADETZKI, 2016). 
We can understand the importance of stable oil markets for Saudi Arabia due to their 
dependency on oil. Saudi Arabia’s oil policies have always been towards maximization 
and sustainability which was easy when the country could play a leverage role in the oil 
sector.  
The objective of the OPEC is at stake today due to two main reasons which make Saudi’s 
excess capacity advantage less attractive: the rise of the shale industry and Russia and 
ARAMCO’s IPO.  
Back in January 2017, OPEC members and their allies started to cut their production to 
support the recovery of the oil price. While it is easy for Saudi Arabia to fill the gap in 
production to meet world demand it is much harder to implement a strategy to cut world 
production. Most of the OPEC countries have followed through the plan in which 21 
countries are attempting to reduce production by almost 1.8 million barrels a day 
(WINGFIELD, DODGE, SAM, 2018). Figure 3 shows the production in thousands of 
barrels a day for February 2018. While Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Libya/Nigeria, Kuwait, 
Angola, Qatar, Ecuador, Algeria, Gabon have met or exceeded the cutback target Iraq 
and Equatorial Guinea did not meet the requirements. Venezuela has cut back its 
production notably, reaching the cutback target on an average of 212% since January 
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2017. However, the cut in Venezuelan production is unintentional and due to an 
economic crisis.  
Figure 3 February 2018 crude oil production (mbbld) 
Source: Bloomberg “OPEC Oil Cuts Deepen” 
Non-OPEC countries, however, have not been cutting production efficiently. Only 
Mexico, Oman, Brunei and Sudan have reached the cutback target. On the run to be 
world’s leading producer, Russia did not achieve the cutback targeted by producing 
10’953 thousand barrels a day; 12% more than the quantity agreed. Nevertheless, OPEC 
countries cutbacks were positive. From January 2018 to April 2018 cutbacks averaged 
156%. OPEC’s allies, however, did not reach the target with an average of 74% over the 
same period. Altogether, OPEC countries compensated the lack of cutbacks from their 
allies thanks to the Venezuelan crisis. We see that it takes more than the OPEC 
countries, and especially Saudi Arabia, to affect prices nowadays. On the other side of 
the world, the USA has been pumping more oil than ever, undermining OPEC’s practices 
to create a supply shortage (SMITH, 2018). USA’s ascendance can explain Russian 
production as both are competing for the world’s leading producer rank.  
The second reason lies with Aramco’s IPO, explaining OPEC’s cutbacks (SMITH, 2018). 
The IPO was initially planned for earlier this year and has been postponed to 2019. The 
IPO lead to rethink OPEC oil policy. If listed, the company will have to take into account 
the interests of investors and will be scrutinized by anti-trust legislation (EL GAMAL, 
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LAWLER, 2017). In the United States, anti-trust legislation prohibits price-fixing and 
Aramco could be accused of such if the country follows the OPEC policy of adjusting 
output to manage price.  
The example of Equinor -former Statoil- is a good illustration of the path that Aramco is 
planning to follow. Equinor has been listed in New York and Oslo since 2001 and owned 
by the Norwegian government which has a stake of 67%. Since its listing, the company 
has refrained from joining any international steps related to regulation of oil outputs. 
Aramco’s leaders have met with Equinor to talk over the best approach to restructure 
Aramco’s operations and prepare the IPO (EL GAMAL, LAWLER, 2017). 
Saudi Arabia is at the moment still a member of the OPEC but due to those two important 
points, one could wonder if the OPEC is not about to lose the precious influence of one 
of their founding member in a foreseeable future.  
1.1.3 Comparison to Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) is the Mexican state-owned oil producing company. The 
company headquartered in Mexico city is also engaging in the exploration, production, 
refining and marketing of oil and gas. Pemex operates principally in Mexico, America 
(North, Central, South) and Europe. In terms of production, Mexico experienced some 
decrease in production over the years due to a natural decline in matured fields. In 2017, 
two significant discoveries have been made in Mexico, one offshore by private 
companies as Mexico changed its fiscal reform in 2013 and one onshore discovered by 
PEMEX. The latter giving hope for a recovery in PEMEX’s production. (PARASKOVA, 
2018) 
The table below shows the similarities and differences of the two companies. The 
information and figures were found on PEMEX’s and Aramco’s official website. 
Table 1 Comparison of PEMEX & Aramco 
 PEMEX Aramco 
Type State-owned State-owned  
Headquarters Mexico Saudi Arabia 
Market structure Monopolistic Monopolistic 
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Activity Exploration, production, 
refining, marketing 
Exploration, production, 
refining, distribution, 
marketing 
Region Mexico, America (North, 
Central, South), Europe 
Asia, North America, 
Europe 
OPEC Member No Yes 
Listed company No No - IPO by the end of 
2018 for 5% 
Oil production 2016 2.154 mmbpd 10.5 mmbpd 
Reserves 2016 9.762 billions barrels 260.8 billions barrels 
Exports 2016 1’194 thousand barrels 2’799 millions barrels 
Type of crude Maya, Isthmus, Olmeca 
Heavy crude oil (50%) 
Medium crude oil (35%) 
Super light (25%) 
Arabian 
Super light crude oil  
Light crude oil 
Petroleum fiscal regime Concessionary since 2013 Go-it-alone strategy 
Both companies display several similarities; they are state-owned, monopolistic and non-
listed. The definition of their activities is similar with the exception of PEMEX not stating 
distribution as an activity. PEMEX is more active in the West region of the globe with 
Mexico, America and Aramco in the East region with Asia. Mexico is not an OPEC 
member, it is however an ally to the OPEC members.  
The main difference to highlight for the purpose of the upcoming analysis is the 
production size; Aramco’s production is almost 5 times bigger than PEMEX’s which will 
most likely oblige us to take a different approach to a possible hedging strategy. 
In terms of crude oil, Maya crude, which is the most common crude oil produced by 
PEMEX is a heavy crude (high density) that needs special refineries to be pre-treated. 
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Isthmus crude oil is a medium crude and Olmeca a light crude oil. Arabian crude oils are 
mainly of high standards and are considered light and super light crude oil. The Sulphur 
content in Aramco’s crude is also lower than in PEMEX’s making it a sweeter type of 
crude.  
The fiscal regimes of each country, i.e. the set of laws, regulations and agreements 
governing the profits derived from petroleum exploration and production are different as 
well. Saudi Arabia has a go-it-alone strategy. It means that the country has chosen to 
develop its domestic resources on its own. The government formulates and finances an 
investment program which is executed through the National Oil Company, Saudi 
Aramco. Saudi Aramco exploits their resources base as a mean of supporting the 
domestic economy and as a tool to sustain the country’s supply. This strategy can create 
an under-investment situation, potentially generating stagnation in growth capacity as 
well as inability to maintain or increase production capacity. This situation happened to 
Mexico. who has changed its fiscal model in 2013 for a concessionary regime resulting 
in a narrow opening on its oil & gas sector for international players. It was made through 
restrictive terms of risk service contracts. It was an crucial change for Mexico who could 
not allocate large capital in exploration. Opening the oil market to international players 
allows opportunities for experimentation and innovation. Norway adopted an hybrid 
solution of NOC (Equinor) and IOC combined. The fiscal reform (Energy Reform) 
became a law in August 2014 in Mexico (DANIEL, KEEN, MCPHERSON, 2010) 
1.2 Derivatives 
Financial products, especially derivatives, are generally perceived negatively by the 
public opinion, particularly when the word “speculation” is employed. Most of the time, 
when we see a topic on derivatives in the newspapers, it is associated with tremendous 
losses and scandals – Enron in 2001, Lehman Brothers 2008. But without them, the 
industrialized world as we know it could not be absorbed by the financial markets. The 
origins of are related to the development of commercial operations and they date back 
to very old times. Interest rate swaps, commodity derivatives and currency structured 
products which we know today are the offsprings of old business practices 
(PALANIAPPAN, 2017). Trading was a conventional practice and people were 
exchanging goods and services before the invention of money. One would barter goods 
it had in excess for goods it lacked (BURN-CALLANDER, 2014). Non-perishable items 
such as grains or wine were used as a storing value.  
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Around 4500 BC, the people of Sumer, a region of ancient Mesopotamia – today’s Iraq 
and Kuwait used clay tablets to represent commodities and recorded delivery dates for 
traded goods. This practice bears a certain resemblance to futures contracts. 
(PALANIAPPAN, 2017) 
The first example of a derivative transaction was recorded in Aristotle’s work around 600 
BC, in ancient Greece, by Thales of Miletus who became the world’s first olive oil 
derivatives trader. Thales was challenged by an ancient question “If you are so smart, 
why aren’t you rich?” and so he used his knowledge of astronomy to predict good olive 
crops in the coming season to become rich. He positioned himself to profit from the rising 
price of oil; he invested the little money he had to reserve each olive oil press so that he 
would benefit from its exclusive use during harvest time. When the harvest came, Thales’ 
predictions became fulfilling and, as he had the monopoly over the production of olive 
oil, he could charge high price for olive oil which was in high demand.  The contract he 
had made with the owner of the press was in substance, no different from today’s 
derivatives. It could have been either an option or a forward depending on the terms. By 
reserving each olive oil press, Thales gave a deposit which entitled him to the use of the 
press at harvest time. If it was only a right and not an obligation this transaction could 
have been called an option. If on the other hand, he would have had to pay for the olive 
oil press at harvest time whether he made a use of it or not, this would have been called 
a forward. (CHATNANI, 2010) 
In the same way, the Athenians used shipping contracts in which they specified the 
pricing, the type of commodity and its volume as well as a period of time. The practice 
comes is familiar to forwards contracts. In Medieval Europe, the use of “fair letters” during 
the Champagne fairs was of a great improvement for trades. They acted like a promise 
of payment with people buying at one fair and promising to pay at a later one. The 
Champagne fairs acted like a clearing house settling debits and credits at the end of 
each day (PALANIAPPAN, 2017). 
As demonstrated through common old practices, the evolution of humanity brought the 
evolution of the financial world, leading us to the financial products we know today. 
1.2.1 Types of instruments 
The basic idea of derivatives is that traders, producers or consumers want to insure 
themselves against a risk. On the other hand the counterparty must be willing to take on 
that risk. In this context, we can therefore talk about risk transfer; the risk being 
transferred from the seller to the buyer or vice versa.  
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Derivatives are financial instruments dealing with assets. Hence, they do not perform by 
themselves, but according to the asset, called the underlying, from which the price 
derives. A financial derivative can be very broadly defined as a contract whose value 
depends on the value of an underlying asset. 
We can distinguish two types of underlying:  
Commodity underlying Financial underlying 
Agricultural, Metals, Energy, …  Publicly traded stock, stock market index, 
exchange rate  
In this paper, we will look at off-balance sheet instruments such as forwards, futures, 
options and swaps used to manage financial risk on a commodity underlying. Appendix 
A sums up the four instruments in a table.  
1.2.1.1 Forwards 
A forward contract is a private agreement between two counterparties, namely the buyer 
and the seller, to trade an asset on a specified date in the future. The price is fixed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract for a delivery in the future. A forward contract is an 
Over-The-Counter (OTC) traded derivatives with customized terms and features. The 
downside to such agreement is that one party may fail to honor its commitment and so 
each party is taking the credit risk of the other counterparty.  
There are two forms of settlement in a forward contract: physically-settled and cash-
settled contract. In a physically-settled contract, the seller has to deliver the contract’s 
specified quantity and the buyer has to pay the agreed price. In a cash-settled contract, 
no asset is delivered. The spot price of the asset at maturity is compared to the contract’s 
price and the party loosing must compensate the party gaining for the difference. If the 
spot price is higher than the contract price, it means that the contract price is more 
advantageous for the buyer so the seller has to compensate him. Inversely, if the contract 
price is higher than the spot price, the buyer has to compensate the seller for the 
difference.  
Forwards are generally settled physically and thus require delivery as illustrated in Figure 
4 with the example of a wheat farmer. A common motivation to enter into a forward 
contract is to hedge an existing market exposure which means reducing the cash flow 
uncertainty arising from the market exposure. The farmer is concerned about the price 
of wheat in three months’ time, when his crops will be harvested. The farmer is exposed 
to the risk of declining prices. By entering in a three-month forward contract as a seller, 
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the farmer can lock-in a price and therefore avoid price fluctuations by securing his cash 
flow. 
The buyer of the forward contract will have the opposite price exposure; he is concerned 
by the rising price of wheat. It might be an agribusiness which needs wheat as an input 
in its production and would like to lock-in a price at which it could purchase wheat.  
Figure 4 Forward schema 
 
1.2.1.2 Futures 
Futures contracts are essentially like forward contracts but standardized and traded on 
an organized exchange. As seen under the forward section, forward contracts terms are 
set consensually by the buyer and the seller. In futures contract, the exchange 
determines all the terms except for the price. The exchange determines the commodity 
underlying the contract, the quantity of one contract, the delivery date, the 
grade/minimum quality of the commodity, the delivery point and the currency. Buyers 
and sellers submit their orders to the exchange and indicate the number of contracts 
they would like to buy or sell. The exchange then matches the orders. In Figure 5, we 
clearly see that there is no connection between the buyer and the seller. Orders are 
made to the organized exchange and payment are made through it as well.  
Figure 5 Futures schema 
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In substance forwards and futures have the same function but the exchange lay 
important differences.  
By its standardization, futures contract generally do 
not provide a good hedge as customizable forward 
contracts unless the hedging needs coincide with the 
terms of the standardized contracts.  
Under a forward contract, each party takes on a 
counterparty risk. In a futures contract, the exchange guarantees performance of the 
contract, which means that the exchange becomes counterparty to the buyer and to the 
seller. This makes it less riskier than a forward; a process is called novation process. 
The exchange takes on the credit risk through the clearing house. The clearing house is 
therefore the intermediate to all futures transactions.  
To guarantee the performance of the contract obligations, the clearing house has a risk 
management system which requires each party to deposit a margin. The margin 
resembles to a “good faith” deposit and serves as a collateral.  
The minimum level for the initial margin and the maintenance margins are set by the 
exchange. At the opening of the contract, each party has to deposit an initial margin 
which usually represents 10% of the contract value in a margin account. As the clearing 
house completes mark-to-market calculations every day, margin accounts are 
debited/credited accordingly. If the futures price rises (falls), the buyer has made a paper 
profit (loss) and the seller a paper loss (profit); the payment of paper profit/loss is made 
through the margin. If the loss incurred sets the margin account at a level lower than the 
maintenance margin, the clearing house sends a margin call to the party concerned. The 
party concerned has to restore the margin account up to the initial margin the same day 
to keep the position open.  
Through futures contracts, the hedger eliminates the risks. But in reality, it is difficult to 
eliminate all risks. To eliminate all risks, one would need the futures contract to match 
perfectly with its physical contract: the quantity, the precise date, the underlying, the 
quality. If we consider the precise date, a futures contract is subject to a delivery period 
before which the hedging position needs to be closed or else the contract will turn into a 
physical contract. The position needs to be offset during the trading period, before the 
expiry, which usually occurs a month prior to the delivery date. This creates a mismatch 
calendar wise. The hedge cannot cover a specific contract period. All risks can therefore 
not be eliminated, the hedger will be facing what we call the basis risk. The basis risk is 
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the difference between the spot price of the asset hedged and the futures price. It is 
represented by the widening or narrowing of basis from the moment the hedge is put into 
place until it is closed.  
In the eventuality the asset hedged is similar to the one in the futures contract, the basis 
risk would equal zero at the expiration of the futures contract. During the hedging period, 
the basis can be either positive or negative. If the basis is positive, meaning that the spot 
price is higher than the futures price, the market is said to be in backwardation. If the 
basis is negative, meaning that the spot price is lower than the futures price, the market 
is said to be in contango.  
If however, the asset hedged is different than the underlying of the futures contract, we 
are in a situation of cross hedging. In a cross hedging situation, the basis will never equal 
zero, even at the expiration. The basis can be reduced by finding a futures contract which 
is highly correlated to the asset hedged. High correlation will result in a lower basis and 
improved hedge effectiveness. It is important to note that the spot price and the futures 
price are positively correlated. Futures hedging works to bring a zero-zero sum. In a 
declining market, a producer who is long physical and short futures, would incur a loss 
on the spot market when selling physical and a gain on futures when buying back futures.   
Gains/losses can be made through the basis. When offsetting a hedge, a producer has 
to go long futures i.e. buy back the same position. If the basis is the same when the 
hedge is lifted, the producer incurs no gain/loss. However, if the basis is lower, the 
producer ends up with a higher net price (WISNER, HOFSTRAND, 2015). 
1.2.1.3 Swaps 
Swaps, like forwards, are OTC contracts. Swaps are effectively portfolios of forwards. In 
a forward contract, the counterparties commit to a single trade. In a swap, the 
counterparties commit to multiple trades over several dates in the future. Swaps are 
financially settled, no physical commodity is delivered. As a bilateral agreement, they are 
a substitute for futures contracts which allow for a better hedge. They rely on the 
exchange pricing to define the financial arrangement. The pricing can also be based on 
trade journal references such as Platts. The attraction of swaps is that basis risk can at 
times be zero, as OTC contracts can often price against the same price reference as the 
physical. For example, FOB Gasoil Amsterdam quote against gasoil has a correlation of 
at 99.9%1. 
                                                 
1 Interview with Dougal Poget, Geneva 
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The counterparty risk of the swap can be transferred to a clearing house. The transaction 
would then be called a cleared swap. A cleared swap benefits from the intermediation of 
the clearing house but is not executed on the exchange (THE ICE, 2011). 
Most commonly used swaps are interest-rate swaps and currency swaps.  Commodity 
swaps involve the exchange of the difference between a specified fixed price and the 
actual floating price of a commodity.  
Let us consider the case an airline company, which buys kerosene on an ongoing basis. 
To reduce the risks related to the price, the company could enter in a forward contract 
for each payment or, to facilitate the transaction, the company could use swaps to hedge 
the stream of payments. In a swap, the counterparties set the estimated amount, the 
maturity of the swap, the payment dates, the floating price ( market price) and the fixed 
price.  
Figure 6 Swaps schema 
Figure 6 shows the structure of a swap but it does not represent the cash-flows. In reality 
the difference is calculated between the fixed price and the variable price and only the 
counterparty owing money to the other makes a payment. The seller of the commodity, 
is said to be the seller of the swap and therefore pays the floating price; he wants 
protection against a falling price. The buyer of the commodity however is seeking 
protection against a rising price and pays a fixed price. When entering into a swap 
contract, the swap value is zero, which means that there are no cost to enter into the 
contract. The changes in prices over the time period will drive the swap value negatively 
or positively.  
In a commodity swap, only one party pays the cash settlement at maturity date.  
If the fixed price is higher than the floating price, then the buyer has to pay the cash 
settlement to the seller.  
If on the other hand the fixed price is lower than the floating price, the seller has to pay 
the cash settlement to the buyer.  
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In the previous section about futures, we defined basis risk and how it influences a hedge 
with a futures contract. In crude oil markets, there are three primary types of basis risk: 
locational basis risk, product/quality basis risk and calendar basis risk.  Each of these 
can be hedge with a basis swap. It is very common for producer to enter into basis swaps 
on quality basis risk for example. It is the perfect combination to eliminates the risks due 
to the standardization of the futures.  
1.2.1.4 Options 
An option is also contract between two counterparties and can be OTC or exchange- 
traded. An option provides a sort of financial insurance. As the name suggests, options 
are characterized by optionality. The buyer of an option acquires a right to - buy or sell – 
a determined quantity of a good at a specified time and at a determined price called the 
strike price. The buyer is also referred to as the holder of the option or is said to be long. 
The buyer has the right to exercise at any time up to the expiry date under an American 
option and under a European option the exercise can only take place at the expiry date. 
To acquire this right, the buyer pays a premium. The seller on the other leg of the contract 
has the obligation to - buy or sell - under the conditions set, should the buyer exercises 
his right. In return, he receives the premium. The seller is also called the writer of the 
option or said to be short.  
The value of the premium has two components: the intrinsic value and the time value. 
The intrinsic value is represents the difference between the market value and the strike 
price; it can never be negative. The time value is influenced by the residual maturity and 
the volatility of the commodity. The further the expiration date of the option is, the greater 
the risk but the greater the flexibility to act. As we get closer to the option’s expiry, the 
temporal value diminishes. On expiry date, the time value equals to zero.  
A call option premium will be more expensive if the market price is high, the strike price 
is low, the residual maturity is long and the volatility is high.  
A put option premium will be more expensive if, the market price is low, the strike price 
is high, the residual maturity is long and the volatility is high.  
1.2.1.4.1 Two types of option 
Call option:  
In this context, the buyer is said to take a long call. His market expectations are bullish; 
he expects the price of the commodity to increase. To acquire his right to buy the 
commodity at a certain price in the future, the buyer pays a premium to the seller. The 
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seller on the other hand, has the obligation to sell the commodity if the option is 
exercised. The buyer will exercise his option if the market price increases. His potential 
profit is unlimited (as per the commodity price). 
Table 2 Call option similes 
 Long call Short call 
Market expectations Increase in price Decrease in price / No 
major fluctuation 
Buy / Sell Buy Sell 
Rights & Obligations Right to buy  
Obligation to pay the 
premium 
Obligation to sell 
Right to the premium 
Bullish market; price  Exercise the right Obligation to sell 
Bearish market; price  No exercise  -  
Potential profit Unlimited  Limited to the premium 
Risks Limited to the premium Limited if covered 
Unlimited if uncovered 
Put option:  
The buyer takes a long put. His market expectations are bearish; he expects the 
price of the commodity to decrease. Like in the call option, the buyer pays the premium 
to acquire his right to sell and the seller receives the premium. The buyer will exercise 
his option if the market price decrease below the strike price. His potential profit is – 
strike price minus the premium –and his risk is limited to the premium.  
 Table 3 Put option similes 
 Long put Short put 
Market expectations Decrease in price Increase in price / No 
major fluctuation 
Buy / Sell Buy Sell 
Rights & Obligations Right to sell 
Obligation to pay the 
premium 
Obligation to buy 
Right to the premium 
Bullish market; price  No exercise -  
Bearish market; price  Exercise the right  Obligation to buy 
Potential profit Limited to  
strike price - premium 
Limited to the premium 
Risks Limited to the premium Limited to  
strike - premium 
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1.2.1.4.2 Four strategies 
Long call 
A wheat consumer is concerned that the price of wheat will rise due to a supply shortage 
caused by dry weather for example. He buys an option:  
1 call wheat $300.00 June 2017 $15.00 (American) 
It is a long call which allows for the purchase of wheat at $300.00 until June 2017. To 
acquire this right, he pays $15.00. The buyer makes a profit when the price of wheat is 
higher than the strike price plus the premium ($300.00+$15.00 = $315.00). The potential 
profit is said to be unlimited; the higher the market price – the higher the profit. At the 
expiry, if the price is below $315.00, the buyer will not exercise and his maximum loss is 
the premium ($15.00). 
Long put 
A wheat producer is concerned the price of wheat will fall due to over-supply for example. 
He buys an option: 
1 put wheat $300.00 June 2017 $15.00 (American) 
It is a long put which allows for the sale of wheat at $300.00 until June 2017. To acquire 
this right, the buyer pays $15.00. The buyer makes a profit when the market price is 
below the strike price – the premium ($300.00 - $15.00 = $285.00). As the market price 
falls, the profit increase. Above $285.00, the buyer makes a loss however limited to the 
premium.  
Short call 
A wheat producer is concerned the price of wheat will fall. He sells an option: 
1 call wheat $300.00 June 2017 $15.00 (American) 
It is a short call which obliges the producer to sell wheat at $300.00 if the option is 
exercised by the buyer. The producer realizew a benefit if the market price is below the 
strike price + the premium ($300.00 + $15.00 = $315.00) at the expiry date as the buyer 
would not exercise under those circumstances. The maximum benefit is the premium 
($15.00). In the eventuality the buyer exercise the option, the producer has the obligation 
to sell wheat at $300.00.  
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Short put 
A wheat consumer is concerned the price of wheat will increase. He sells an option:  
1 put Wheat $300.00 June 2017 $15.00 (American) 
It is a short put which oblige the consumer to buy wheat at $300.00 if the option is 
exercised by the buyer. The seller’s potential profit is limited to the premium and risks 
are limited to the strike price minus the premium ($300.00 - $15.00 = $285$). 
Figure 7  shows the options diagram for the four types of strategies described above.  
Figure 7 Options diagram 
 
The diagram illustrates the limitation in profit for a long put and a short call; one is limited 
to the strike price minus the premium and the other one to the premium. The long call 
offers a possibility of unlimited profit as the latter would rise up with the market price. The 
riskier option of all is consequently the short call with an unlimited potential loss if the 
transaction is undertaken uncovered. The others are limited to the premium or to the 
strike price minus the premium.  
Holding a call option therefore provides an insurance to the holder against an increase 
in the price of the commodity while allowing the holder to take advantage of price 
decreases. There are thus no real alternative to options, as the other instruments fix a 
price without providing optionality to act. However, it involves an up-front costs of buying 
an option (premium) to compensate against the optionality to exercise.  
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1.2.2 The potential risks 
We find three factors which need to be taken into account when evaluating the risks of 
derivatives usage; leverage, volatility and liquidity.  
Leverage is a great “factor” in derivatives instruments which creates a good potential for 
large gains but it does also leverage a losing position if the market moves in the wrong 
direction.  
Volatility adds up to the leverage effect. If the underlying asset displays high volatility 
and unexpected price movements, the effects of leverage will amplify the movements 
under the derivative contracts leading possibly to larger losses.  
Volatility accompanies liquidity. If the market is not liquid enough, it makes it harder to 
exit a position and it therefore increases the risk of the position. Liquidity facilitates the 
distribution of financial risk to market participants who are more able to bear the risks or 
are willing to take them on.  
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2. Analysis  
As seen in the derivatives section, derivatives are useful instrument to manage risks. 
They can be used to hedge an existing market exposure (futures & forwards), to obtain 
downside protection from an exposure without giving up the upside potential (options) 
and to transform the nature of an exposure (swaps). 
2.1 Research methodology  
To undertake the analysis, the resources used are primary and secondary researches. 
Both researches provided me with quantitative and qualitative data.  
For primary research, I used company financial reports to see what were the hedging 
practices in place, if existing, and to understand the managerial decision taken. 
Quantitative data was collected from Auditoria Superior de la Federacion, a Mexican 
government website, the Petroleos Mexicanos, Saudi Aramco’s, EOG Resources’, BP’s, 
Equinor’s as well as the Bank for International Settlements’ websites. Some quantitative 
information was also gathered from secondary resources such as Bloomberg website or 
platform.  
The websites listed above were also used for qualitative data about companies. I have 
additionally collected information in press articles, principally to gather information about 
the Hacienda Hedge. Concerning the theoretical aspect of my thesis, I read books and 
reports.  
2.2 Study of derivatives 
2.2.1 The market size  
Despite the general negative opinion about financial derivatives, financial derivatives are 
widely used. Derivative markets are often estimated at $1.2 quadrillion at high-end 
(CHANG, 2017), exchange and OTC combined, however some analysts believe the 
figure is vastly overstated. Figures in tables below have been retrieved from the Bank for 
International Settlements to assess the size of the market.  
Table 4 and 5 describe the size of the world derivatives market. The first table represents 
the notional outstanding on standard exchanges. Table 4 only shows futures and options 
on interest rate and foreign exchange. The Bank for International Settlements did not 
present any data breakdown per underlying as a result no details were available on 
commodities contracts as well as no information on the gross market value. 
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Table 4 Exchange-traded futures and options 
 
Source: The Bank for International Settlements 
As of July 2017, the notional outstanding was at $81 trillion ($33 trillion in futures and 
$47 trillion in options). In over two decades, the notional outstanding has quadrupled. 
From 2010 to 2017, the size of the exchange has increased by 30% and we have had a 
shift between the use of futures in 1998 and to the use of options. As of 2010, options 
are the predominantly used instruments. Over the past years, we have been in a situation 
of sustained trends on all markets (equity, bonds and commodities) which I believe could 
explain the shift in utilization. Volatility has decreased in most markets which induce that 
option premiums are less expensive and therefore more attractive. 
Table 5 shows the notional outstanding in OTC derivatives market amounting to $459 
trillions in July 2017; notional amounts represent the face value of the underlying asset. 
The gross market value represents $12 trillions. Gross market value is a better indication 
of the actual risk as it characterizes the total value of outstanding contracts. We can see 
an increase from 1998 to 2010, from a gross market value of $3 trillions to $12 trillions. 
In over two decades, OTC derivatives market expanded greatly with swaps representing 
80% of the market, followed by options (11%). Lastly, we find commodities contracts 
separately for the purpose of the thesis. The notional outstanding representing $1.4 
trillions; $1’023 billions in forwards and swaps and $378 billions in options. Forwards and 
swaps amounting to $136 billions in gross market value.  
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Table 5 Global OTC derivatives market 
 
Source: The Bank for International Settlements 
As the OTC market involves bilateral agreements, I suspect that the information available 
are not representative of the actual market size as data is not always available. The 
figures collected do not come close to the $1.2 quadrillion estimation. I believe 
calculations were made on the notional amount. OTC and exchange markets combined 
come to a notional outstanding of $540’690 billions (OTC $459’660 billions + $81’031 
billions exchange traded) The result is greater in value than all stock markets combined 
($73 trillion) (CHANG, 2017). This amount come close to low-end estimation of $540 
trillion as made by analysts. I believe it is more accurate to look at the gross market 
value. Due to the lack of transparency of the exchange, only OTC gross market is 
available. However, with a $136 billions of gross market value on commodities contracts 
only, we can consider that the market is displaying sufficient liquidity  
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2.2.2 PEMEX & the Hacienda Hedge 
The Hacienda Hedge is the largest oil trade made on Wall Street, as stated in Javier 
Blas’s article “Uncovering the Secret History of Wall Street’s largest oil trade”. Every year 
since 2008, Mexico hedges a great amount of the country’s production. The decision 
involves a dozen representatives from three Mexican government ministries and Pemex. 
It is executed through a couple of oil trading desks such as Barclays, Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank. PEMEX buys put options which give them the right to 
sell oil at a predetermined future price. Their outlook on the market is that the price will 
drop and they want to be insured against it. This type of deal has been a thinking since 
the 1980s when Mexico was seeking to stabilize its fiscal stance. It was however 
undertaken for the first time in 1990 after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The country 
did not want to suffer another oil crisis like the one in 1985-86 when Saudi Arabia 
submerged the market by increasing its production and prices plummeted. After that, 
Mexico did not enter in a hedging program for years until the early 2000s. (BLAS, 2017).  
2.2.2.1 Annual reports  
In its annual reports, PEMEX recognizes the use of financial derivatives to manage 
interest rate risk, exchange rate risk as well as commodity price risk for natural gas. 
Concerning crude oil, the company states in its Notes to the Consolidated Financial 
Statements 2008; 
“Under its fiscal regime, Pemex transfers most of its risk related to crude oil prices to the 
Mexican Government. As a consequence, Pemex generally does not enter into long-
term hedging transactions against fluctuations in crude oil prices. During 2008 and 2007, 
Pemex did not enter into any crude oil price hedging transactions.”.  
As a result, no evidence of derivatives practice was found in the annexes on crude oil 
derivatives for those years. In 2009, the company engages in futures contracts (7.15 
MMb) and exchange traded swaps (2.86 MMb). In 2010, they used futures for 4.93 MMb 
and exchange traded swaps for 0.32 MMb as well as in OTC swaps for 0.55 MMb 
(PEMEX 2010 Annual report, p. 59). In 2011, PEMEX used the same type of derivatives. 
Regarding annual report 2012, the derivatives products were classified as non-hedging 
instruments as they do not qualify to the strict requirements of IAS 39 (PEMEX 2012 
Annual report, p. 50). After 2013, there is no annual report available in the publication 
section on Pemex’s website.  
As seen in accounting class, under IFRS and US GAAP, derivatives instruments used 
for hedging purposes are not recorded in the balance sheet. However I read another 
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note in the annual reports concerning the differentiation in accounting arising from 
derivatives used in the purpose of trading and hedging. Financial derivatives recognized 
in the balance sheet were valued at fair value. Changes in the fair value of derivatives 
held for trading purposes are recorded in the cash flow results and derivatives used as 
hedge are recorded in the statement of operations using the fair value method. It is not 
clear what the criteria are for an instrument to be considered as a hedge. In Table 6, we 
find the reported financial results of PEMEX expressed in USD. The figures from 2008 
to 2012 are audited results. The reports starting of 2013 are unaudited and did not 
mention any distinction between financial instruments used for hedging and trading. The 
consolidated statement of operations was not available either.  
From 2009 to 2012, PEMEX recorded losses 3 years out of 5. Profits were recorded in 
2009 and 2010 for respectively $1’124’507 and $1’042’778 thousand. No further 
information was found in the details of the transactions. 
Table 6 Pemex’s consolidated results 
 Source: PEMEX 
Some unaudited annexes on the financial reports produced for each quarter starting of 
2012 revealed information on crude oil derivatives. The company reported crude oil stock 
market futures, stock market swaps i.e. cleared and OTC swaps. Appendix B is a 
composition I have made from the annexes on financial reports starting of 2015. The 
information found shows the utilisation of swaps and futures from 2015 to the first quarter 
of 2018. Starting of the second quarter of 2017 only, Pemex has been using options. 
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However, transactions do not correspond to the world’s largest oil trade because of its 
quantity and no option strategy was recorded before 2017. 
The information found is therefore considered as internal practices of PEMEX. From 
2012 to 2016, Pemex as a company did not enter in any option contract, failing to predict 
the drop in price in 2014. It is only when the price started rising again, in the second 
quarter of 2017, that PEMEX entered into a hedging strategy which included options for 
$228 million representing 68.7 million barrels as per Appendix B. The hedging program 
is still on going as per the information gathered for the first quarter of 2018. As seen 
previously, it comes with no surprise that options are used during high prices to protect 
against an eventual fall in prices by buying a put option.  
From 2008 to 2018, PEMEX is utilizing both markets – spot and futures- and therefore 
reduces its price risk by being only concerned by the basis risk. The oil market being 
volatile, limiting the risk to the basis risk is a great way to reduce the financial impact of 
changing price. The company has also been using swaps. A better way to mitigate risk 
for PEMEX would have been to enter into a basis swap on top of the futures contracts, 
in order to mitigate the basis risk.  
As a result, no information concerning the largest oil trade on Wall Street was found on 
PEMEX’s annual reports and annexes which explains why the Hacienda Hedge accounts 
for Mexico’s profit. The decisions are not internal to the company and the deals are 
managed on a governmental level even though it is technically PEMEX’s production 
which is being hedged. It is however notorious that Mexico hedges every year and the 
information are to be found in the legislature’s annual audit; the “Auditoria Superior de la 
Federacion” (ASF). 
2.2.2.2 Auditoria Superior de la Federacion 
In order to better understand the Hacienda Hedge, I looked at the Auditoria Superior de 
la Federacion (ASF) website in Spanish. Some hedging programs implemented by the 
country are registered at the ASF. We find information on execution details such as 
trades date, quantity,  cost and even benefits being transferred to the Federal 
Government.  
Figure 8 displays the amount of barrels bought from 2009 to 2016 as part of the Mexican 
hedging program as well as each deal’s average price. The figures correspond to millions 
of barrels and US dollars per barrel.  
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On average, the country has hedged 233 millions barrels per year with average prices 
higher in 2012-2015 when oil prices were relatively high. 
Figure 8 Mexican oil hedging 2009-2016 
 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
With daily production decreasing from 2'601 to 2'154 thousand barrels between 2009 
and 2016, the hedging program covers on average 24% of the total production with an 
average of 233 million barrels per hedging program, i.e. per year as per my calculation 
in Table 7. In 2009, Mexico hedged about 10% more than its average, as prices were 
reaching $140.00 per barrel. The hedging program is based on Maya crude, so I have 
calculated the portion of the deal considering only Maya crude oil production. Mexico 
hedges about 50% of its Maya crude oil production every year. With options, it is not 
necessary to hedge the entire production, which is fortunate, as the market would not 
sustain such a large contract size. The contract size is one of the reason Mexico buys 
its OTC option through a number of investment bank. The biggest hedging programs 
were set in 2006 and 2008 for 454 and 435 million barrels respectively. This 
characteristic is key as to discussing the possibility for Saudi Arabia to enter in such 
program due to the size of its production. Obviously, this calculation of the hedging 
amount should not take into account the secured sales nor their proper consumption. 
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Table 7 Production/Hedging size comparison 2009-2016 
 
Source: PEMEX & Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
Figure 9 displays the total cost related to the oil hedging program since 2001. The cost 
has been calculated based on the information found in a report of the “Centro de Estudios 
de la Finanzas Publicas”. As figures were available in million Pesos, I have calculated 
the cost and the profit in US Dollars by averaging the annual exchange rate published 
quarterly on the Bureau of the Fiscal Service – US Treasury Department. The 
calculations are to be found in Appendix C. Hedging costs vary between $217 million 
and $1’257 millions.  
Figure 9 Hedging Program Cost in Million USD 2001-2017 
During the 15 years of the hedging program, Mexico has not exercised its option every 
time and has only made a profit during three years; 2009, 2015 and 2016 as shown in 
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table 8 below. The revenues generated in 2009, 2015 and 2016 were respectively of 
$5.0 billion, $6.5 billion and $2.8 billion. The three-year revenues of $14.5 billion minus 
the cost of the premium of $11.6 billion comes out to a total profit of $2.8 billion. On a 
year basis, the average profit is $190 million which is an unneglectable amount. I 
understand that assessing the benefits for Mexico is more complex than simply looking 
at the difference in costs and revenues.  
Table 8 Hedging Program 2001-2017 
Source: Centro de Estudios de la Finanzas Publicas (CEFP) 
I have retrieved the price of Brent crude oil since 2008 to 2017 to compare each years 
strike price with low-high-average prices as Maya crude was not available. We note on 
table 9 that despite low prices going below the strike price in 2008 and 2014, the option 
was not exercised as the average was higher than the strike price. In 2009, the low price 
was higher than the one in 2008, but the average was lower than the strike price of 2019. 
By looking at the years where options were exercised, we observe that the average price 
needs to be below the strike price for it to represent low price level i.e. a bearish market. 
It is not sufficient to have prices drop to really low levels and oscillate at higher heights. 
Indeed, in the Mexican program, the type of option bought seems to be Asian style put 
options (BLAS, 2017) which compares the strike price to an average price over a certain 
period rather than one price at the expiration like in European option. Profitable years for 
Mexico were represented by low oil prices and preceded high oil prices. The 2009 strike 
price of $70 was set during 2008, when oil price experienced all-time high. From July to 
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September 2008, prices moved from $143.68 to $93.52. It is hard to say exactly when 
the put options were bought, but it was certainly during that period of time. The 
percentage on high and on average I calculated represents the percentage of the strike 
price on high and average prices from the previous year. In 2009, it means that if based 
on $143.68, the strike price represents 48.72% of 2008 high price and 78.72% of 2008 
average price. $88.92. 48% does not range in the habitual practice, and is biased by the 
exceptional high oil price. I believe the strike price usually represents between 67% and 
78% of the market price. As the premium is influenced by the strike price as well, it would 
be more expensive for Mexico if the strike price was high compared to the market price 
at the time of conclusion. I think strike price are more likely to be set around 70% of the 
market price i.e. based on high prices. Premiums tend to be more expensive when the 
strike price is high compared to the market price in put options. 
Table 9 Brent crude oil price 2008-2017 
 
 
Source: Macrotrends 
2.2.2.3 The 2008-2009 hedging period 
Due to the secrecy of the deal I have not been able to find detailed information about the 
construction of the Hacienda hedge in 2008-2009. As seen in Table 10, the deal was 
made through four banks over August and September 2008. Barclays took the biggest 
part of the deal (220 million barrels) followed by Goldman Sachs (85 million barrels). 
Deutsche Bank bought 15 million barrels and Morgan Stanley 10 million barrels. As the 
banks executed the deal, oil prices started falling, reaching an average of less than $55 
per barrel in 2009. With an average option price of $70, Mexico was making a great deal.  
The annual hedge made by the government is composed of a mix of Maya and Brent; a 
decade ago the Mexican Government locked in the price of WTI but this practice created 
issues because of the changing relationship between WTI and Maya. As a result, Brent 
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considered as a world standard has been chosen to be mixed in the deal with 80-90% of 
Maya crude oil. 
Table 10 Options calculations on Pemex’s 2008-2009 deal ($) 
Source: BLAS Javier – Bloomberg Markets 
When the price dropped under the average strike price, PEMEX exercised their option. 
By the end of December 2009, the four banks had transferred the balance due to Mexico. 
Mexico’s revenue on this deal was $5’084’873’500 ($5 billion). 
The revenue in the article by Blas Javier for 2009 hedging program was reported in 
Appendix C to avoid a difference of 223 million dollars. The difference would arise from 
the exchange rate average calculated in the appendix. The calculations undertaken are 
of general guidance for the purpose of the thesis. It was therefore not necessary to 
calculate 2009 revenue.  
We note in Table 10 a differential between the strike price of Maya and Brent crude oil. 
The differential of $18.00 and $20.50 is quite significant (21-24%). The reason for the 
price difference arises from the difference in quality. Maya crude oil has a 22°API gravity 
and 3.3 % sulfur (PEMEX, Glossary). API gravity characterized whether the crude oil is 
light or heavy. At 22°API gravity, Maya crude is a heavy crude. The higher the number, 
the lighter the crude. We consider crude oil to be light at 30°API gravity 
(PETROLEUM.CO.UK, 2015). The sulfur content tells us if the crude oil is sweet or sour. 
The lower the sulfur content, the sweetest the crude oil. A sweet crude oil is easier to 
refine and safer to extract. Crude oil is considered sour at 0.5% of sulfur content 
(PETROLEUM.CO.UK, 2015). Maya crude oil is therefore a heavy sour crude oil. As a 
comparison, Brent crude oil, 38.06°API gravity and 0.37 %. Brent crude oil is a sweet 
light type. This is the reason why we observe an important differential.  
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The second reason is locational. Crude oil produced further from market will incur higher 
transportation costs to get to the market.  
In Figure 10, we see that prices of different crude oils move largely in coordination. I 
have chosen to compare Brent with Arab Light, Arab Heavy and Maya, four different 
quality of crude oil which illustrates differentials due to quality and location. We can see 
that Arab light’s curve is closer to Brent’s. The quality of Arab light being 33.4°API gravity 
and 1.77 % sulfur (MCKINSEY) making it a light but sour crude oil. Arab heavy is a heavy 
and sour crude oil (27.4°API gravity and 2.80 % sulfur) like Maya crude oil. Compared to 
Maya crude oil, Arab heavy is indeed less heavy and less sour, as confirmed by the 
chart. 
Figure 10 Maya-Brent-Arab crude oil differential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oilprice.com 
2.2.2.4 The 2009-2010 hedging period 
The size of this hedging was of 230 million barrels at an average option price of $56.69. 
It was of a duration of five months, going from August 2009 to December 2009. To 
finance the deal, an amount of Pesos 18’000’000’000 (18 billion) was borrowed from the 
Fondo de Estabilizacion de los Ingresos Petroleros (FEIP). The cost of the premium was 
of $5.0827/ barrel and involved a cost of $1’171’669’000 (1.1 billions) representing Pesos 
15’554’996’200.  
Table 11 displays the type of crude, the number of operation needed to concretize the 
deal, the amount of barrels expressed in million as well as the premium price, the strike 
price and the total cost in million dollars and pesos. Strike price in the 2009-2010 hedging 
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program demonstrated as well a differential of 15% (56.00/66.00*100) between Maya 
and Brent crude oil. The differential was however much lower than the precedent year 
for unknown reason. Maya premium per barrel on 110 million barrels and 100 million 
barrels  was different. The difference is related to the bank taking the counterparty. It 
seems that Goldman Sachs has priced a lower premium ($4.8729) on 110 million barrels 
than JP Morgan and Barclays Capital ($5.318 per barrel). 
Table 11 Options’ purchase 2009-2010 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico 
The information about the 2009-2010 hedging program give us a greater understanding 
of the structure of the deal. Table 12 demonstrates the number of transaction required 
to conclude the program. Three trading desks were involved: Barclays, Goldman Sachs, 
JP Morgan. The deal was split into 43 transactions; Barclays 16 transactions, Goldman 
Sachs 24 transactions and JP Morgan 3 transactions. This represents an average of 
5’348’837 barrels per transaction. On a five-month period, considering that the banks are 
open Monday to Friday, we have 100 days on which to split 43 transactions; a transaction 
would have been executed roughly every second day.  
Table 12 Counterparties intervening in 2009-2010 hedging program 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico 
The 2009-2010 options were not exercised but the structure gives us an idea of the 
procedure of the deal which could be applied to Saudi Aramco’s case. If options were 
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bought by Aramco, the deal would have to be OTC as well and spread through a 
number of transactions via multiple investment banks.  
2.2.2.5 Fondo de Estabilizacion de los Ingresos Petroleros (FEIP) 
The FEIP is a Petroleum Income Stabilization Fund in which the profit issued from the 
hedging program are transferred. The fund was created 26th April 2001 due to the 
volatility in petroleum revenues and the uncertainty related to it. In 2009, the $5 billion 
were transferred to the Federal Government in order to cover the diminution in revenues 
of the Federal Government due to lower collection of tax revenues, lower oil prices and 
lower quantity of crude oil extractions. According to the Article 19, section IV, second 
paragraph of the Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law, the surplus of income 
will be allocated until reaching an adequate reserve to face the fall in the Participatory 
Federal Fundraising, the oil revenue of the Federal Government and PEMEX. I have not 
found information on the current level of the fund nor the estimated amount of adequate 
reserve estimated. 
The outtake of the Mexican hedging program for the purpose of this thesis is first, the 
fact that one does not need to hedge all of its production to benefit from hedging. Mexico 
has been hedging a significant quantity of its production on a year basis. Further analysis 
would need to be undertaken to estimates the actual profitability of the hedging program 
on the budget. Does the profits from the hedging program provide enough revenues to 
the Government? I do not believe so. Options come with non-negligible cost and 
uncertainty. Over a period of 15 years, the country has exercised their options only three 
times, which could signify that this type of strategy would not bring stability to Saudi 
Arabia. To understand why the country buys put option despite the fact that it does not 
seem profitable, I have looked a bit further and found an interesting explanation. Mexico 
benefits from the hedging program through its borrowing terms. By hedging through put 
options, the country is considered to be protected from lower oil prices by its creditors. 
An analysis has shown that “Mexico’s sovereign borrowing costs would be 19 basis 
points higher in the absence of hedging” (VALENCIA, Unknown publication date). This 
is where the real benefit of put options resides. Mexico had a public debt of 56,1% of 
GDP in 2017 (GLOBAL FINANCE, 2018). With a GDP of $1’124.3 billion (GLOBAL 
FINANCE, 2018), public debt amounts to 630 billions. The savings in term of interest 
cost could therefore amount to over 1 billion per year.2 Put options thus allow the country 
to save on borrowing costs every year.   
                                                 
2 Interview with Frédéric Ruiz, deputy director of the ISFB, Geneva, 2 June 2018 
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2.2.3 EOG Resources Inc. 
EOG Resources Inc. was founded in 1985 and is active in the exploration, development, 
production and marketing of crude oil & natural gas. The company works primarily in the 
major producing basins of the USA as well as in the Republic of Trinidad, the UK, China 
and Canada.  
As of December 2017, the net proven reserves of crude oil amounting 1’313 million 
barrels of crude oil and condensate reserves. 97% of its reserves are located in the USA, 
2% in Trinidad and 1% in international areas.  
EOG's business strategy is to maximize the rate of return 
on interest capital and the company does so by controlling 
its costs of capital and utilizing advanced technology 
associated to horizontal drilling and fracking.  
Figure 11 shows EOG’s crude oil and condensate 
production from 2013 to 2017. In 2017, the production 
amounted to 337’000 barrels a day which is much lower 
level than PEMEX or Aramco. The company’s annual 
report on Form-10K provide us with interesting information 
on their hedging practices.  
Source: EOG Resources 
2.2.3.1 Financial derivatives practices 
EOG utilizes primarily price swaps, options, swaptions, collars and basis swaps contracts 
to manage their price risk.  
Table 13 reveals EOG derivatives practices of 2013 and 2014. EOG reported a crude oil 
derivative contract for 2014. According to the explanation given, the derivative contract 
could be categorized as a swaption. EOG gave the counterparty the option to extend 
certain current derivative contracts for an additional period of six- or nine-months. By 
definition, a swaption gives a right to enter at a future date in a swap for a precise period 
at a fixed price. We notice that the contracts are for a volume in barrels per day ranging 
between 171’000 and 10’000 barrels.  
The 2015 annual report provided no information on derivatives transactions except for 
these concerning natural gas.   
 
Figure 11 EOG’s crude oil  
production 2013 - 2017 
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Table 13 EOG Derivatives contracts 2013 - 2014 
Source: EOG Resources 
In 2016’s annual report, EOG reported two crude oil transactions (Table 14). The first 
one was a normal contract on a commodity for a period of two weeks (12-30 April) and 
a quantity of 90’000 barrels a day at an average price of $42.30. Another covered May  
1st to June 30th for 128’000 barrels a day at an average price of 42.56. A transaction was 
recorded for 2017, covering from January 1st to June 30th for a quantity of 35’000 barrels 
a day at 50.04.  
For the second semester of 2016, EOG opted for a crude oil collar. A collar is considered 
to be an advanced hedging strategy as it combines two options; a long put with a short 
call. The duration of the collar was from 1st September to the 31st December for a quantity 
of 70’000 barrels a day. We do not have any information on the premium paid; the 
structuring of the options can lead to what is called a zero cost collar where by the 
premium paid in the long put is offset by the premium received in the short call. I believe 
it was not a zero cost collar. The ceiling price indicates that the strike price of the short 
call was $54.25 and the floor price indicates that the strike price of the long put was 
$45.00. If the Index price (WTI) is between the collar range of $54.25 and $45.00, EOG 
does not incur a hedging gain or loss. However, if the Index price moves above $54.25, 
EOG has to pay the difference between the ceiling price and the index price. However, 
if the Index price is below the floor price of 45.00, EOG is entitled to receive the difference 
between the floor price and the Index price.  
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Table 14 EOG Derivatives contracts - Annual report 2016 
 
Source: EOG Resources 
The 2017 annual report details on three contracts were found (Table 15). Two were basis 
swap contracts and one was a crude oil swap.  
EOG enters in crude oil basis swaps in order to avoid the differential between prices in 
Midland/Cushing as well as Gulf Coast/Cushing, Cushing location being related to the 
NYMEX WTI Futures. The basis risk covered in this context is a locational basis.  
In the first case, the weighted average differential price of 1.063 represents the amount 
of reduction to Cushing, Oklahoma. The swap covers a volume of 15’000 barrels a day 
running from the 1st February 2018 to the 31st December 2018.  
Another swap concerning the same basis risk has already been put in place for 2019 for 
a quantity of 20’000 barrels a day for a differential of 1.075.  
The last one is a swap on crude oil. We can see two closed transactions for 2017 and 
that the hedge only covered the first 6 months of 2017. There is an open transaction 
concerning 2018. The open transaction is a swap for a quantity of 37’000 barrels a day, 
covering January 1st to December 31st  2018. As the natural physical position of EOG is 
long, its swap position would have to be short. EOG is seeking protection against a fall 
in the price and is paying a floating price. If at the expiry the average floating price is 
higher than the fixed price, EOG would have to pay the cash settlement to the buyer. If 
it is lower, EOG will receive the payment of the cash settlement.  
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Table 15 EOG Derivatives contracts- Annual report 2017 
Source: EOG Resources 
EOG practices from 2013 to 2017 have exhibited the utilization of swaps, swaptions, 
basis swaps as well as collar. Considering the structure of the company it is not surprising 
to see that the company has chosen the least costly instruments. Shale companies have 
the incentive to hedge because of their funding structure, they cannot afford a declining 
revenues. With cheap drilling methods come cheaper financial derivatives. Most of their 
hedge are conducted on an annual basis, a few of them cover only a 6-month period. 
Swaps also provide better hedging than futures, as they avoid one of the most common 
basis risk for oil producers known as calendar basis risk. They do not have margin 
requirement or initial costs. The collar is a good strategy to avoid the high cost of a 
premium. Whether the collar is costless or not, if the strategy is well managed, the 
premium received from the short call could cover a portion of the premium of the long 
put.  
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2.2.4 British Petroleum Plc (BP) 
BP headquartered in London was founded in 1908 as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
BP is one of the seven world leading supermajors in oil and gas. The company is an 
international company with expertise in the exploration, production, refining, marketing, 
power generation and trading of oil and natural gas. As of 31st December 2017, BP had 
a crude oil production of 3.6 million barrels per day and proved reserves of 18’441 million 
barrels (BP, 2018). 
2.2.4.1 Annual reports 
The analysis undertaken here is a bit different than the previous one as no information 
was available in terms of contracts specification, which is understandable given the size 
of the company. The analysis was therefore focusing on the company’s oil derivatives 
size in million dollars and the maturity dates. BP acknowledges using oil options and 
futures to mitigate price risk. They undertake trading by using OTC contracts in 
combination with other derivatives contracts. Market exposure is measured using the 
value-at-risk technique. Trading activity is supported by a limit of $100 million of value-
at-risk.  
Table 16 displays the assets and liabilities at fair value of derivatives instruments as of 
the 31st December 2017 and 2016. For 2017, we come to a figure for oil price derivatives 
of $1’637 million assets and of $1’281 million liabilities, giving us a net value of $356 
million. We can see that oil derivatives represent a much smaller chunk than natural gas 
price derivatives. From 2016, the net value has decreased by $235 million.  
Table 16 BP Derivatives instruments at fair value on 31st December 2017- 2016 
Source: BP 
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The assets and liabilities in million dollars presented in Table 17 were classified by 
maturity.  Most of them are held for less than a year. A report on hedging effectiveness 
and futures contract maturity (RIPPLE & MOOSA, 2005) has highlighted that hedging is 
more effective by using the near-month contract than a more distant one (6-month). This 
could suggest that a considerable part of the instruments are futures with short maturity. 
Short maturity instruments provide a low-risk alternative as well as they provide great 
market liquidity.  
Table 17 BP Derivatives assets and liabilities by maturity 
Source: BP 
Table 18 represents all the derivative asset and liabilities not only oil contracts which 
were sorted by hierarchy level. The hierarchy level represents the marketability of the 
instrument used. As a general guidance, level one accounts for easily marketable 
instruments such as exchange traded derivatives. Level two represents the OTC 
financial swaps and the physical commodity contracts. Their valuation is made by using 
public markets information and quotations provided by brokers. For less liquid markets 
and long-term contracts, the value is more difficult to establish due to the rarity of the 
contracts and the unpredictability. Those are characterized by the level three and they 
are valued using internal methodologies. By looking at the hierarchy level classification, 
we notice that there are no level 1 derivatives. This comes to dismiss my suggestion on 
their use of futures derivatives on oil. Due to the classification, it appears to me that BP 
does not use exchange traded derivatives surprisingly at all despite mentioning their 
utilization in the annual report. They take on counterparty risks in their contracts. As a 
result, we find a netting by counterparty in diminution of the fair value. The netting by 
counterparty is a risk mitigation method.  
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Table 18 Derivatives assets and liabilities by hierarchy level 
Source: BP 
OTC contracts are used because they are not standardized. It allows BP to customize 
and can better fulfill the hedging needs. It is hard to say whether BP is using OTC options, 
forwards or swaps; as I have not found information on cost such as premium I believe 
they use forwards and swaps. On short term option contracts, temporal value would be 
close to 0 as temporal value equals zero at maturity date. A low temporal value means 
the option has little or almost no time to be profitable, if not already profitable. This 
involves higher risk taken on.  Moreover, options are  really to be considered as 
insurances, and high prices followed by a fall in the market are needed to truly benefit 
from such instruments. Forwards and swaps however, allows to lock in a price on 
customized terms without paying high premiums which could potentially go to waste and 
reduce the overall profitability of the hedging program over the years.  
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2.2.5 Equinor 
Equinor is the new name given to Statoil, the Norwegian oil company as of 2018 Annual 
General Meeting. The purpose of it was to remove “oil” from their name as the company 
is shifting its focus to broader energy generation.  
The Norwegian state is the majority shareholder of the company for 67%. On top of that 
we can add the Norwegian national insurance fund for which the ownership interest is of 
3%. The rest of its shareholders are private entities.  
The daily production of oil and oil equivalent for 2017 amounted to 2’134 millions.  
2.2.5.1 Financial derivatives practice 
No information were available as to contracts specifications on oil. However the company 
acknowledges the use of financial derivatives. Equinor uses futures, options, forwards 
as well as OTC market swaps and contracts for differences related to crude oil/petroleum 
products. In short, they use the four instruments available. The maturity is usually of less 
than a year and they are traded on the Inter Continental Exchange (ICE), the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), the OTC Brent market as well as the swap markets 
(EQUINOR 2017). 
The reason why I have chosen to analyze Equinor is because of the company’s structure; 
with a mix of state & private ownership the company could in the future be more apparent 
to Saudi Aramco. With its IPO planned for 2019, Aramco might have a great deal to learn 
from the former Statoil even if only 5% of the stock is listed, the liberalization of the 
country might lead to larger public opening in the coming years.  
In 1996, Statoil created the “Oljefondet”; the Government Pension Fund of Norway. And 
every year since, the government transfers its revenue from the company to the fund. 
The mission of the fund is to build financial wealth for current and futures generations. 
The market value of the fund is 8’425 billion NOK.  
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Figure 12 The market value to the Government Pension Fund Global, 1996-2017 
Source: The Norges Bank Investment Management 
Figure 13 shows us the evolution of the size of the fund in billion NOK as in relation to 
GDP. Since 2010, the market value of the fund represents more than a 100% of the 
GDP.  
This has been possible through their investments. On a general note, the investment are 
made in three different asset classes; equities, bonds and global real estate. It represents 
a mix of 72 countries and 9’146 companies. The fund is well diversified and has 
generated a 5.9% annual return since the establishment of the Bank Investment 
Management in 1998. The net annual return after management costs and inflation is 4%. 
There is a fiscal rule which stipulates that a 3% share of the fund can be used to fuel the 
Norwegian economy. Compared to its annual return, it means that the state can finance 
its economy by not touching its revenues but only the return of the funds.  
I believe that there is a structure that Saudi Arabia could learn from. It would however 
require the partial privatization of the company but with the undergoing liberalization of 
Saudi Arabia, I do not see at this point in time and with the knowledge available to me 
why this could not be a viable possibility.  
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3. Discussion 
Findings has shown that despite Aramco being the world’s first crude oil producer, there 
are ways for the company to hedge their production. The analysis covers three different 
size of companies and presented various instruments available for each category 
depending on the company’s structure and the management preferences. I understand 
that none come close to Aramco’s size especially in terms of oil production but as the 
Hacienda Hedge and EOG Resources analysis has demonstrated; it is not necessary to 
hedge the entire production.  
Market size, whether on the organized exchange or on the over-the-counter market,  has 
the capacity to take on an unimaginable number of derivatives contracts. There is a 
significant gap between high-end and low-end estimation which shows that we do not 
clearly know the value of derivatives market. In my opinion, the high end of $1.2 
quadrillion of outstanding notional amount (CHANG, 2017) is overvalued. What is certain 
is that even considering only low-end estimation, the derivatives markets are bigger than 
all stock markets combined. Nonetheless, by looking only at the figures retrieved from 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), I do not believe the results are well 
representative of the actual market size either. Being hard for analysts to evaluate 
markets, it is even harder for me to do so. From the general idea I have and the figures 
from the BIS, I think derivatives markets size is not a relevant point for the evaluation of 
the feasibility of a hedging strategy for Saudi Arabia as the market seems to be important 
enough in size. A significant question would concern the counterparties; would OPEC’s 
leader find counterparties ? 
Due to the importance of Aramco in the oil trading world, one could think that no 
counterparty would be willing to take the other side of the deal. The reasons are the 
countless measures undertaken by Saudi Arabia within OPEC to regulate prices 
throughout the years. Saudi Arabia is named as a price maker or a price swinger. As 
seen, Saudi Arabia has a large excess capacity which could be used to drive prices down 
or up by cutting production. I believe that this measure, and in relation to it Saudi’s power, 
is overvalued. Overvalued is perhaps a strong word to define their influence at this time 
as Saudi Arabia is currently curbing price with cutbacks measure and it is working in their 
favor but their leverage could be at stake.  
Saudi’s excess production could potentially be a problem if Aramco wishes to enter into 
a long put like the Mexican government. It is indeed easy for Saudi Arabia to drive prices 
down and if holding long put options, the country would have to produce at full capacity 
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to drive prices down, exercise the option and make great revenues on financial 
derivatives.  
But Aramco’s IPO planned for 2019 could void the issue. By listing the company, the 
company will have to take into account the interests of the investors and be ruled by anti-
trust legislation. As said, price-fixing is precluded by anti-trust legislation and Aramco 
could face strong accusation if entering in price adjustment measures. By floating 5% of 
the company, Aramco will have to follow the path of Statoil and step back from 
international measures concerning oil regulation outputs.  
Moreover, the oil market has been undergoing a few changes in terms of oil production. 
One of these changes is the evolution of the shale industry over the last years and the 
improvement made on horizontal drilling and fracking. USA’s oil production has been 
significantly growing since 2010 and I believe it is not about to slow down any time soon. 
US companies have different incentives to produce more every day, the structure of the 
US market is composed by a large number of private companies. Each one of them is 
driving the production up as they are trying to maximize their investments and repay the 
banks financing them. Russia as well, has been pumping more oil to keep its market 
share. The rise of the US/Russian production, supplying the market generously, makes 
it difficult to influence prices on the way up and to keep them high.  
There are two types of derivatives markets available: the exchange and the over-the-
counter markets. For a company like Aramco, it is more suitable to undertake 
transactions in the OTC market. The OTC market would have less impact on spot prices 
as the contract is private. The company would have to find its counterparties like in the 
case of the Hacienda. Large counterparties with which to enter into large transactions 
are investment banks. Investment banks take on risks and off set them on the exchange 
market via transactions of a smaller quantity. By going OTC through investment banks, 
Aramco would not have to comply with exchange regulations, i.e. margin requirements. 
Considering Aramco’s production and potential size of the transactions, a margin 
requirement of 10% would incur an important upfront payment for the company as well 
as margin calls. In a volatile market such as the oil market, margin calls might freeze 
substantial amounts of liquidity and challenge the operations of the company.  
Another important differences determined by the access point is the counterparty risk. 
On exchange-traded markets we find futures contracts. Futures contracts are 
standardized contracts, they do not allow for customization like OTC instruments 
(forwards, swaps, options). The clearing house - the intermediary of the transaction- 
takes on the counterparty risk through the process of novation which exists in OTC 
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contracts. The counterparty risk is hence low in futures contracts in comparison to 
forwards, non-cleared swaps and OTC options. Options are available on standardized 
exchange as well. Options will be traded OTC if customization is required. In the 
Hacienda Hedge, put options were bought OTC as the transaction required a mix of 
Maya and Brent crude oil. Futures contract being the underlying of an option transaction, 
it would not be possible to have an option on Maya crude oil because there is no futures 
contract on Maya crude oil. If Aramco would follow Mexico’s path, the company would 
have to use OTC options as well if they wanted to hedge Arabian crude oil. 
Another particularity of the exchange market is liquidity. The standardization allows for 
the contracts to be traded in an easier manner than customized contracts. However, in 
real life, the market is liquid on short terms contract, but as we go further in time, there 
is less volume traded which makes the market illiquid on medium term to long term 
contract.  
Futures contracts display another difference with OTC contracts; basis risk. Basis risk is 
the price to pay if one choose not to have counterparty risk. Basis is the difference in 
price between the futures contract which is standardized and the physical contract (spot). 
With specified maturity dates and quality, futures contracts are not tailored to the need 
of the hedge and hence bring the risk of not reflecting the reality of the physical contract. 
The advantage of futures is the low counterparty risk. It requires though compliance with 
the exchange regulations and a margin deposit. On top of that, there are brokerage and 
exchange fees. The price is fixed consequently, price risk is inexistent just as are higher 
price opportunities.  
To benefit from a rise in price, an option contract would be a better choice. By fixing the 
floor price, Aramco would secure a minimum price and still be able to benefit from higher 
prices like Mexico. The optionality comes with a premium cost however, which has to be 
paid at the time of the purchase. With the example of the Hacienda Hedge in mind, 
options can be very costly. Through the analysis I have undertaken, options at PEMEX 
were carried out only when oil prices were relatively high. And the Hacienda Hedge has 
proven to us that a drop in price below the average price is required to benefit from their 
strategy. Over 15 years, Mexico exercised the options only three times and this 
demonstrates to me that this instrument does not bring stability. As a result, with the 
knowledge I have on options, I believe they should be used as a complimentary 
instruments and not as a unique strategy.  
 Saudi Arabia: too big to hedge? 
Ariana JUSUFI 
 46 
Swaps on the other hand can eliminate basis risk. Just like an OTC contract, a swap 
contract can be customized and its pricing can be referenced over a physical underlying. 
The counterparty risk is existent unless the swap is cleared through an exchange. Swaps 
incur no cost compared to options and futures. They are cash settled, which means that 
at maturity date one party has to compensate the other in cash and there is no physical 
settlement possibility. Futures in comparison can be physically settled but most of the 
time settlement take place through the offsetting of position.  
As a result, I would recommend the use of a mix of financial derivatives which is the 
same practice as the Norwegian oil company. The company does not have a fixed 
strategy like Mexico. A hedging strategy should change according to the market and 
because the oil market is volatile, it is best not to put a finger on one single instrument.  
Despite the fact that it is indeed possible for Aramco to hedge to some extent, I believe 
Equinor as a company could be a model to Aramco. Their fund would be an 
unneglectable practice which could bring serenity to the country. Aramco could change 
its fiscal regime from a go-it-alone strategy to a hybrid one. A hybrid fiscal regime would 
allow them to invest less in the innovation and technology and benefit from the 
International Oil Company resources and knowledge.  
There are some limitations to this research paper. The research paper does not consider 
the Saudis knowledge on the mechanism of financial derivatives as well as their 
acceptance of such practice. Compliance with Sharia law is also excluded.  
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Conclusion  
My objective was to determine whether or not Saudi Arabia could have its national oil 
company – Saudi Aramco – hedging its production despite their significant production 
and their position within the oil industry.  
The derivatives market size has shown to be extensively vague; there is a vast range 
between high-end estimation and low-end but even low-end estimation provides great 
liquidity. The limitation on the market does not come from the size of the market, but from 
the amount one invest in without causing distresses on the market. I like to think of it as 
a pond; if we throw a tiny stone in the pond, we will see its impact but it dissipates in the 
water and the stone will quickly be covered by the water. If we throw a larger stone, or a 
rock, the crash on the water is more intense and can have impact on the entire pond. It 
is the same with markets. The larger the stone, the larger the distress.  
Concerning the counterparty taking on the other side of the transaction, as I said, OTC 
would be a better option in order to avoid disrupting  the market. If Aramco was to use 
the exchange market, the natural structure of the market should be able to take care of 
it. There are always consumers willing to take the other side or speculators balancing 
out the market structure. In addition to that, I think the status of Saudi Arabia as a price 
maker is obsolete due to the escalation of the shale industry and Russia. Finally, the 
possible reshaping of Saudi’s OPEC policy due to the IPO should also be mentioned. 
A mix of financial derivatives was recommended. Derivative instruments have a number 
of similarities and differences making each one of them specific. A hedging strategy to 
mitigate risk should never be fixed. With oil prices consistently changing, a strategy 
needs to be flexible to the market. Through the analysis, we have seen that Mexico has 
a fixed hedging program; every year the country purchases put options. The findings 
have proven that this strategy has the purpose of reducing borrowing cost on sovereign 
debt. As a result, the strategy is not the most efficient in terms of price mitigation. 
Furthermore, the findings on the Norwegian Oil Company has demonstrated the 
efficiency of the creation of a pension fund which could be considered by Aramco as a 
complimentary step to a hedging strategy. It would not mitigate the price risk but it would 
set the country on a more sustainable path which is exactly what the country is trying to 
achieve with its Vision 2030 project. 
As a conclusion, I trust this research paper has provided my readers with a greater 
understanding of the financial derivatives in general and in particular those related to the 
oil market. 
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Appendix A: Financial derivatives table 
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Appendix B: PEMEX Derivatives use 2015 - 2018 
First quarter 2015      
 
Second quarter 2015 
 
Third quarter 2015 
 
Fourth quarter 2015 
 
 
First quarter 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Saudi Arabia: too big to hedge? 
Ariana JUSUFI 
 55 
Second quarter 2016 
 
Third quarter 2016 
 
Fourth quarter 2016 
 
First quarter 2017 
 
 
Second quarter 2017 
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Third quarter 2017 
 
 
 
Fourth quarter 2017 
 
 
 
First quarter 2018 
 
 
Source: PEMEX 
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Appendix C: Mexico’s hedging program profit 
calculation 
 
Source: Centro de Estudios de la Finanzas Publicas (CEFP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sourrce: Bureau of the Fiscal Service – US Treasury 
